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ADOPTION AND THE LAW OF DESCENT AND
DISTRIBUTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
AND A PROPOSAL FOR MODEL
LEGISLATION
Emilio S. Binavincet
The author examines civil-law and common-law rules of descent and dis-
tribution in adoptive filiation and concludes that these rules fail to reflect
the recognized function of adoption and the prevailing theory of inheritance.
He questions the validity of the underlying policy of legislation that formu-
lates an inheritance arrangement in adoptive filiation different from that
accepted in natural filiation. Observing that inheritance in adoptive filiation
finds its justification, along with the other effects of adoption, in the func-
tion of adoption itself, he offers a model law on the effects of adoption that
completely equates adoptive filiation with natural legitimate filiation.
I
INTRODUCTION
After World War II there was a dramatic increase in adoption the world
over. The problem of finding decent homes and responsible tutelage for the
countless orphans left by the war brought to the foreground the necessity
of devising a suitable legal institution. For most countries in Europe the
answer was sought in the hitherto little-used institution of adoption.' In
the United States, adoption was widely practiced even before the war. The
mounting number of adoptions which were noted during the war years did
not abate with the coming of peace: in 1951, 80,000 adoption petitions
were filed in the United States-sixty per cent more than in 1944; 2 in
1955, the number of petitions filed increased to 93,000;' in the period
1951 to 1960, almost a million children were adopted. 4
The popularity of adoption poses numerous problems. Notably, it con-
fronts us with the necessity of making a frank reexamination of our old
attitudes towards the adoptive relationship. Adoption is an artificial filia-
tion, a sort of legal make-believe; it does not have the natural and extra-
legal foundation of consanguinity filiation. For this reason, questions ha-
t LL.B. Quezon University (Phil.) 1957; M.C.L. Tulane University 1960; LL.M. Har-
vard University 1962. Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law (Common Law Section),
University of Ottawa; Alexander-von-Humboldt Fellow, Institute of Legal Philosophy,
University of Bonn.
I See U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Comparative Analysis of Adoption Laws(1956).
2 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 14," at
1 (1953).
3 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 39," at
1 (1957).
4 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 66," at
2 (1962).
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bitually ignored in natural filiation gain unique perspective and relevance
in adoptive filiation. For instance, no dispute can arise as to who are "chil-
dren," or "cparents" in natural filiation, whereas much dispute has arisen
over these terms in adoptive filiation. These disputes suggest that con-
ventional assumptions, doctrines, and even terminologies lose their famil-
iar meaning if examined against the background of adoption; more im-
portant, they show that we find it psychologically difficult to reconcile
ourselves to the operative existence of legal consequences created by a
mere make-believe. The introduction of a foreign element invariably pro-
vokes prompt reactions from the natural family of the adoptive parent;
the adopted child's natural relations have occasional difficulties forgetting
the bond created by blood. The motives of these relations are likely to be
personal: attempting to protect what they assume to be their own in-
terests.
The main burden of this study is to ascertain and evaluate the legisla-
tive and judicial arrangements of descent and distribution currently exist-
ing in the civil-law and common-law jurisdictions.5 To conclude the work,
5 The following statutes in common-law jurisdictions were consulted in this study: Ala.
Code tit. 27, §§ 5, 9 (Supp. 1963); Alaska Stat. § 20.10.120 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 8-108 (Supp. 1964); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-109 (1947); Cal. Prob. Code § 259; Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 152-2-4, 153-2-1 (1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-65 (1960); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 13, § 920 (1953); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-222 (1961); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 731.30
(1964); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-414 (1964); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 331-16 (1955); Idaho Code
Ann. § 16-1508 (Supp. 1963); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1507 (1943); M11. Ann. Stat. ch. 3,
§ 14 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 6-208 (Supp. 1964); Iowa Code Ann. § 600.6
(1950); Iowa Code Ann. § 633.222 (1964); Kan. Gen. Ann. §§ 59-507, -2103 (1949);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199.520 (1962); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 535 (1964); Md. Ann. Code
art. 93, § 147 (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 210, § 7 (1955); Mich. Comp. Laws §§
702.86, .94, 710.9 (1948); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.29 (1959); Miss. Code Ann. § 1269-06 (Supp.
1964); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.090 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 61-212 (Supp. 1965);
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-110 to -111 (1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 127-160 (1957); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 416:6, 461:7 (1955) ; N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2A:22-3, 9:3-30 (Supp. 1963); N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 22-2-10, -19 (1953); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-17
(Supp. 1963); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-11-13 to -14 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.13
(Page .. 1960); Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 60.16 (1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 111.210, .212 (1963);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 1.8 (1950); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-7-16 (Supp. 1964); R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 15-7-17 (1956); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-52.1 (1962); S.D. Code § 14.0407 (Supp.
1960); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-126 (Supp. 1964); Tex. Prob. Code § 40 (1956); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-30-9 to -10 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 448 (Supp. 1963); Va. Code Ann.
§ 63-357 (1950); Va. Code Ann. § 63-358 (Supp. 1964); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.32.140'
(1961); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4759 (1961); Wis. Stat. §§ 48.92, 322.04 (1961); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 1-727 (1957); Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 53, § 76 (1960) (Can.); English Adoption Act,
7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 5, §§ 16-17 (1958). The following materials in civil-law jurisdictions were
also consulted: Ley No. 13.252 del 23 Septiembre de 1948 (Argen.) [hereinafter cited as
Ley No. 13.252]; Brazil Civil Code (Wheless transl. 1920) [hereinafter cited as Braz. Civ.
Code]; Code Civil (Fr. Dalloz ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Code Civil]; Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch (Ger. 9th ed. Soergel-Siebert 1963) [hereinafter cited as B.G.B.]; Codice Civile
(Italy 3d ed. Torrente & Pescatore 1961) [hereinafter cited as Codice Civile]; La. Civil
Code (1870) (as amended); Mexico Civil Code (Schoenrich transl. 1950) [hereinafter cited
as Mex. Civ. Code]; Phil. Civil Code (1950) [hereinafter cited as Phil. Civ. Code]; Que.
Rev. Stat. c. 324, § 18 (1941) (Can.).
The research for this paper was concluded on March 20, 1965. At that time a number of
reforms concerning adoption legislation were in progress in many jurisdictions. One con-
sulting the above materials must be warned of probable changes since March 20, 1965.
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a model statute which it is hoped will satisfactorily solve the problem will
be offered.
Somm GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A study of this nature appears disjointed and incoherent unless some
facts and principles of the civil-law and common-law systems are kept in
mind. First, there is the way adoption entered into the civil and common
law and the purpose it was intended to serve. Adoption is an ancient insti-
tution in the civil law, tracing its origin to Roman law. The form of
adoption in vogue in the civil-law today is an improved and systematized
version of Roman adoption, practiced even before the Twelve Tables.'
Roman adoption, like most institutions of ancient societies,7 served largely
a religious function." When adoption found its way into Europe, the reli-
gious function had vanished but it had not yet outgrown the egoistic as-
sumption implicit in its original function. Christian Europe needed a new
orientation for adoption. However, this was not found in the concept of
adoption as a philanthropic institution for the benefit of the adopted child.
Rather, adoption was conceived as a means of constituting the adopted
child an heir to perpetuate the adoptive parent's property and name;
the emphasis did not move from the adoptive parent to the adopted
child. Not until the two recent wars did the idea of heirship move to a
6 Early Roman adoption was either "arrogation" or adoption in the strict sense. Arroga-
tion, the more ancient of the two, originally required a law in every case; the person
adopted was a "sui juris." He lost his original status, his person and properties were trans-
ferred to the authority of the "pater adrogans," and as a consequence his rights and obliga-
tions were extinguished. Adoption in the strict sense, the early predecessor of modern civil-
law adoption, was the adoption of a person not sui juris. It did not alter the rights and
obligations within the natural family of -the parties since the adopted child was incapable
of having rights and obligations; it effected only a transfer of parental authority over the
adopted child. For details, see Sohm, Institutionen des rSmischen Rechts 528-31 (17th ed.
Mitteis & Wengler 1949); Weiss, Institutionen r~mischen Privatrechts 470-73 (2d ed. 1949).
7 The law of Manu declares: "He to whom nature has denied a son can adopt one, so
that the funeral ceremonies may not cease." 2 Kocourek & Wigmore, Evolution of Law
344 (1915).
8 The Roman belief in the "sacra privata," relates Cicero, was deep-seated and continued
to exist even after cremation became an accepted practice. Cicero, Tusculan I, ff 16 (Loeb
ed. 1927). Family worship and sacrifices were sacred obligations because the "kinfolks who
are dead [are] . . . considered godsY Cicero, De legibus II, f1 9 (Loeb ed. 1928),. The con-
tinuity of the "sacra privata" was dependent upon the presence of a legitimate male
descendant, and to die without such descendant was an alarming curse which the Romans
feared. For instance, an inscription in a Roman tombstone reads: "'May he who removes or
damages this stone be the last male scion of his race (ultimus suorum)." 1 Westrup, Intro-
duction to Early Roman Law 63 (1944). They easily recognized that marriage was no
guarantee for the birth of a legitimate male issue. Id. at 91-93. To meet the problem of
extinction of the family cult, adoption was devised to permit the "pater familias" to infuse
a stranger's blood into his race. Id. at 105. In essence, early Roman adoption was a gift
from one family to another and a means of imitating nature. As Cicero suggests, adoption
meant asking religion and the law for that which nature had not bestowed. Cicero, De domo
sua XIII, 11 34 (Loeb ed. 1935).
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great degree to the background; 9 at the present time the transformation
is not complete. 0
Early common law, on the other hand, did not recognize adoption;" as
a result, early colonial America had no adoption statute. But when adop-
tion was finally accepted, it was for a motive materially different from
that in the civil-law jurisdictions. Adoption legislation in the common-law
areas was a part of the movement for social reform that appeared in Eng-
land even before the seventeenth century. The welfare of the waif, who
was at first subject to the devices of apprenticeship and indenture, was the
focus of the law that ultimately developed into the modern common-law
adoption.' The common-law areas have always conceived adoption as an
altruistic institution for promoting the child's welfare.
9 In France, the personal ambition of Napoleon played an important role in the introduc-
tion of adoption. Long before the French Revolution, the adoption in fashion during the
Roman days in France had long disappeared. Custom of the localities dominated the regula-
tion of adoption. Although the drafters of the Code Napoleon did not retain adoption in its
"projet," it was introduced through the influence of Napoleon. Napoleon had been interested
in adoption and divorce for political reasons. Planiol relates:
[I]t was due to Bonaparte that two institutions, adoption and divorce by mutual
consent, were introduced into the Code. He did so for political reasons. Having no
children by his marriage with Josephine Beauharnais, and already dreaming about
founding a dynasty, he placed in reserve in our laws this double means of obtaining
an heir, either by another marriage or by adoption .... He prevented the publication
of the minutes to adoption that it will never be known what ideas he had in that subject.
1 Planiol, Traite elementaire de droit civil 60 (La. State L. Inst. transl. 1959).
10 In Bolivia gratitude adoption, such as the adoption of a child who saved the life of
the adoptive parent, is still recognized. In fact, in many civil-law jurisdictions, especially
in Latin America, the adopted child is looked upon as inferior, sometimes as worse than an
illegitimate child.
11 Kolb v. Ruhl's Adm'r, 303 Ky. 604, 198 S.W.2d 326 (1946) ; In re Eddin's Estate, 66 S.D.
109, 279 N.W. 244 (1938); 17 Halsbury, Laws of England 11 (1911). Bracton relates that
only in the story of Thomas of Saleby did the common law go far enough towards permit-
ting something like adoption. 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 391, 396 (2d ed.
1911). Saleby's resourceful wife claimed a villager's daughter as her child to prevent Saleby's
brother taking land upon Saleby's dying childless. The common law held the child to be
legitimate. The common law, however, was not here flirting with the reception of adoption
when it reached this conclusion. It simply refused to inquire into a child's paternity because
of the common law's strong presumption of legitimate filiation. Id. at 396.
The reason why the common law refused to accept adoption is not yet wholly clear. One
commentator has suggested that "the nature of the English feudal system and the English
reverence for the heirs of the blood of the ancestor" were the reasons. Kuhlmann, "Intestate
Succession by and from the Adopted Child," 28 Wash. U.L.Q. 221, 233 (1943). Another
view relies only on "the sentiment or . . .the peculiarities of the feudal tenures." Brosnan,
"The Law of Adoption," 22 Colum. L. Rev. 332 (1922). Jenks offers an interesting psycho-
logical explanation: "In later time inertia, coupled with the generally satisfactory working
of the familiar social phenomenon whereby elderly childless people 'adopted' children, edu-
cated them, fed and clothed them, and quite probably, provided for them by their wills
presumably account for a failure legally to recognize adoption in England prior to 1926."
Jenks, Book of English Law 294-95 (2d ed. 1929).
12 Uhlenhopp, "Adoption in Iowa," 40 Iowa L. Rev. 228 (1955). The first adoption
statute in England was passed in 1926. Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5,
c. 29. The American states had adoption statutes before mother England, mainly tracing
their origin to the civil-law models. See, e.g., Ala. Code, ch. 385 (1852) (now Ala. Code tit.
27, §§ 1-9 (1958)); Tex. Gen. State Law 1859, ch. 33 (now Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 46a
(Supp. 1964)). For this reason, one has made the exaggerated statement that "Roman law
is the unquestioned source of our adoption statutes today." Brosnan, supra note 11, at 332.
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The current theory of inheritance in the civil and common law must
also be adequately understood. 13 The rationalism in the present law of
inheritance emerged only after the disappearance of the feudal arrange-
ments; its motto is the individualism of the eighteenth century. Almost
universally the civil and common-law worlds today recognize the power
of the individual to determine the destination of at least part of his prop-
erty, even after death. The power of free disposition is no longer the
limited exception that it was in older laws; it has developed into the rule. 4
Some states had adoption laws without precedent going back to the civil law, and perhaps
the Massachusetts adoption law has the strongest claim of being the first. Mass. Acts &
Resolves 1851, ch. 324 (now Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 210, §§ 1-11a (Supp. 1964)). See Knox,
Family and the Law 93 (1937). McFarlane, "The Mississippi Law on Adoption," 10 Miss. LJ.
239 (1938), claims the honor for Mississippi.
13 For an extensive discussion of the historical development in comparative perspective,
see 5 Staudinger, Kommentar zum Blirgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einffihrungsgesetz und
Nebengesetzen 35-55 (11th ed. 1954).
The common law has followed, until recently, the Germanic system of inheritance which
separates land from chattels. In England until primogeniture was abolished in 1925, Ad-
ministration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, the rule was that the land should descend
according to the primogenitary system, whereas the decedent ought to dispose of his chattels
by will. The rule of primogeniture was the scheme of distribution upon the death of the
decedent; any attempt by the decedent to direct the destination of his land was regarded
with suspicion. See Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 725 (5th ed. 1956). On
the other hand, precisely the opposite policy was followed in the descent of chattels. The
decedent was expected, indeed obliged, to make a testamentary disposition of his chattels.
At one time to die without a will disposing of one's chattels was looked upon as horrible
sin, and some regarded it even as a crime. To early common law, "the man who dies intestate
dies unconfessed, and the man who dies unconfessed ... ; God's mercy is infinite; but...
the intestate [cannot be buried] in consecrated soil." 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English
Law 356 (2d ed. 1911).
The implicatioa of the old rule in our present law is still far-reaching, and it is not with-
out reason that Maitland writes harshly of our system of inheritance:
It is in the province of inheritance that our medieval law made its worst mistakes.
They were natural mistakes. There was much to be said for the simple plan of giving
all the land to the eldest son. There was much to be said for allowing the courts of the
church to assume a jurisdiction, even an exclusive jurisdiction, in testamentary causes.
We can hardly blame our ancestors for this dread of intestacy without attacking their
religious beliefs. But the consequences have been evil. We rue them at the present day,
and shall rue them so long as there is talk of real and personal property.
2 Pollock & Maitland, supra at 363.
The Roman succession was unitary and universal; no distinction between land and chattel
was attempted, and the heir succeeded to the totality of the decedent's properties and obliga-
tion. The reason for this rule was the hereditary family worship of Roman society; property
was an adjunct to the family cult. Intestate succession to properties was the recognized rule
in Roman law; the making of a will was the exception and a much later elaboration. If a
testament was allowed, a strict apportionment of the expense of the family worship among
the heirs had to be settled. As Cicero affirms, the family worship was an indestructible part
of inheritance, to be transmitted from generation to generation. Cicero, De legibus II, 1 19
(Loeb ed. 1928).
14 This complete reversal of assumption in succession explains many common doctrines
in our law. The civilian law and common law look with disfavor on the substitution of a legal
scheme of distribution for the decedent's preferences formally declared in a will. Cf. Buckland
& McNair, Roman Law and Common Law at xv (2d ed. 1952). They hesitate to declare a
decedent to be dying intestate rather than testate; they will cautiously avoid total or partial
revocation of a will if the effect is to result in intestate distribution. Where doubt exists,
they are inclined to resolve it in favor of the validity of a disposition, and only when clear
inconsistency is established will the courts nullify the provisions of a will. The doctrine of
dependent relative revocation is a case in point. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47
S.E. 501 (1904) ; Cutler v. Cutler, 130 N.C. 1, 40 S.E. 689 (1902) ; In re Bernard's Settle-
ment, [1916] 1 Ch. 552; Onions v. Tyrer, 1 P. Wins. 344, 24 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1716).
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The law of descent and distribution attempts to effectuate a disposition
for a person who died without having disposed of his estate; the estate de-
volves according to his "tacit will" and those who receive it are his tacit
heirs.' 5
Sound and desirable reforms have been accomplished in many fields to
reflect these novel theories of adoption and inheritance. But reform in the
law of descent and distribution reflecting the new function of adoption has
not fared as well. The temperament of the civilian legislator has been ex-
tremely constrained because of the still distorted popular conception of
adoption. In most civil-law areas, inheritance in the adoptive relationship
is regulated in accordance with Roman-law rules, especially those intro-
duced by Justinian. 6 The major rules in the civil-law areas were made
15 The principle that modem law considers the implied intention of the decedent primary
in the formulation of intestate arrangement does not, however, explain the whole structure
of succession. There are numerous rules that cannot be accommodated by this principle, and
in a number of instances the state limits the freedom of disposition to realize some necessary
policy. For instance, the law compels the decedent to allocate a part of his estate to the
members of his family. Some jurisdictions direct that the decedent cannot injure a certain
fraction of his estate by lucrative disposition, and others sometimes overdo it by declaring
onerous dispositions void or voidable. The exclusion of this "forced portion" in fact vaguely
creates a vested right in the beneficiaries that becomes absolute upon death. The right of free
expression of liberality is thus subordinated to the fulfullment of a family duty. If the
testator attempts to "pretermit" a forced heir, the whole will becomes void. He is only
permitted to "disinherit" the forced heir upon good cause, such as unworthiness or the
commission of an offense against him.
16 Justinian introduced a reform in intestate succession of the adoptive family because he
felt that adoption could create injustice for the adopted child in certain instances. This
would occur if the adopted child was emancipated by the adoptive father, for the adopted
child would then be excluded from the adoptive parent's succession. Since by adoption he
already lost his right to succeed the natural father, he succeeded from nobody. This would
be the case, Justinian thought, if the adopted child was a stranger or if the adoption was
made by a person other than an ascendant. If the adoptive parent was a maternal grand-
father, or in case the father was emancipated, a paternal or maternal great grandfather, the
child still succeeded as a member of the agnatic or cognatic family. To remedy this situa-
tion, Justinian ordered that adoption by a person other than an ascendant does not remove
the child from his original family. See Bergmann, Beitrige zum r~mischen Adoptionsrecht
7-40 (1912).
Justinian's law provides:
But now, by our constitution, when a filius-familia is given in adoption by his natural
father to a stranger, the power of the natural father is not dissolved; no right passes
to the adoptive father, nor is the adopted son in his power, although we allow such
son the right of succession to his adoptive father dying intestate. But if a natural father
should give his son in adoption, not to a stranger, but to the son's maternal grandfather;
or supposing the natural father has been emancipated, if he gives the son in adoption
to the son's paternal grandfather; or the son's paternal great grandfather; or if the
natural father gives the son to the son's maternal grandfather, or great grandfather,
then in this case, as the rights of nature and adoption concur in the same person, the
power of the adoptive father, knit by natural ties and strengthened by the legal form
of adoption, is preserved undiminished, so that the adopted son is both in the family,
and in the power, of his adoptive father.
Justinian, Institutes I, tit. XI, f1 2 (8th ed. Sandar 1888). Commentators called the adop-
tions developed by this innovation as "adoptio plena" and "adoptio minus plena." See Kaser,
Das r~mische Privatrecht 237-39 (3d ed. 1964), for a short summary of these kinds of adop-
tion. The changes made by Justinian have been criticized in his days and at later times.
See 1 Colquhoun, Summary of Roman Law 557-58 (1849). For a sophisticated discussion,
see Bergmann, supra at 41-98. It might be mentioned also that these terms are still used in
many civil-law countries, especially in Latin America.
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before World War II and practically no changes have been made in newer
codes. The common-law legislator has been more active in this field than
his civilian counterpart and remarkable improvements have been
achieved.
However, the common-law areas have also shown substantial opposition
to progressive reforms,17 especially the courts. Since adoption is a legisla-
tive creature, the common-law technique of interpreting statutes enables
the courts to impose their traditional conservatism even upon progressive
legislation. The courts construe adoption legislation within the framework
of the common law, which did not even recognize adoption much less in-
heritance through adoptive filiation.'8 As a corollary, the courts are an-
tagonistic to the introduction of an outsider into the scheme of inheritance
of the natural family, adhering to the idea of consanguinity as a theory
of descent and distribution. 9
III
INHERITANCE BETWEEN THE CHILD AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT
Legislative regulation of the successional rights of the adopted child
and the adoptive parents appears to be quite detailed. In some common-
law states the law declares that this right should be set out in the decree
of adoption; others formally regulate the relationship by statute. The
agreement among the states on common premises and policies is more
pronounced in this area than any other, perhaps because theoretically the
benefits granted to the parties in the estate of each other are not too diffi-
cult to justify. Because of the unequivocal motives of the parties to an
adoption, it is easy to appreciate that some adequate form of filiation
should exist between the adopted child and adoptive parent. Once such
17 The opposition against the inheritance provision of the Uniform Adoption Act should
be sufficient proof. See Merrill & Merrill, "Towards Uniformity in Adoption Law," 40 Iowa
L. Rev. 299 (1955).
18 Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906). Pound, "Common Law and
Legislation," 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908), criticizes this peculiar juristic technique. For a
defense, see Allen, Law in the Making 387-91 (4th ed. 1946).
19 The firm language of the court in Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 60, 240 Pac. 991, 993
(1925), goes far enough to illustrate these points:
Throughout the statute of the several states consanguinity is fundamental in legisla-
tive fixing of descent and distribution of property. True, the subject is one of legislative
will; but legislation repudiating or eliminating blood relationship from the descent of
property would be so abhorrent to every incident of our home and family life as to
meet with general disapproval. The courts should depart from this elemental guideship
only when forced to do so by an inexorable statutory demand. Our statute is inexorable
in its demand that the estate of one dying shall go to his kindred; those of his blood,
flesh of his flesh, bone of the bone. To such kindred, the father, the mother, the grand-
father, the grandmother, the children, the grandchildren, the collaterals of blood relation,
and only to those who are kin, those of the same blood, does the chapter anywhere
extend; .... The statute on adoption must be read into the statute of distribution
and descent, but it is to be read only to effectuate the precise terms of the statute on
adoption ....
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filiation is accepted, it is not difficult to fashion a successional arrange-
ment between them.
In common-law areas, the successional scheme is often one-sided: the
child almost universally being recognized as an intestate heir, whereas the
parent is not permitted to inherit from the child.20 It is felt that the phil-
anthropic principle of adoption dictates this so as to prevent the adoptive
parent from enriching himself.
The courts have taken the initiative in formulating rules of descent
and distribution in the common-law area where the statutes have provided
only cryptic or general regulation. Typically the statute simply provides
that the adoptive parents of the child shall be invested with every legal
right in respect to the obedience and maintenance of the child as if born
to them in lawful wedlock. 1 The judicial interpretation of such a statute
is not uniform. The successional right of the adopted child is almost axi-
omatic with the courts, but they support the right on differing grounds. 2
The majority's rationale is exemplified by the construction of the Cali-
fornia statute.23 The California courts assume that the inheritance right
of the child is inherent in the establishment of the relationship; inheri-
tance is understood as an incident of paternity and filiation so that no
express statutory grant is necessary.24 The courts consider the general
stipulation of the law that the adopted child and adoptive parent shall
bear toward each other the legal relation of parent and child with all
the rights and duties of this relation as adequate basis for the recogni-
20 In 44 of the 52 common-law jurisdictions, statutory provisions expressly allow the
adopted child the right to take in the intestate estate of his adoptive parent, whereas the
remaining 8 common-law jurisdictions have statutes which do not explicitly allow or deny
the adopted child a right to succeed from the adoptive parent. On the other hand, the
succession by the adoptive parent from the adopted child is related to the right of succession
of the natural parents and kindred of the adopted child. Only 29 of the jurisdictions afford
the adoptive parent an absolute right of succession to the estate of the adopted child.
Some common-law jurisdictions grant the adoptive parent the right to succeed from the
adopted child, but such right is dependent upon some limitation such as the source of the
property composing the mass of the estate of the adopted child, the direction contained in
the decree of adoption, and the age of the adopted child at the time of adoption. See, e.g.,
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-109(6) (1947); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-414 (1964); fli. Ann. Stat. ch. 3,
§ 14 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 6-208 (Supp. 1964); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
19, § 535 (1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210, § 7 (1955); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 702.94,
710.9 (1948); Miss. Code Ann. § 1269-06 (Supp. 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-126 (Supp.
1964).
21 Ala. Code tit. 27, § 5 (Supp. 1963). See also the statutes of Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, note 5 supra.
22 See Estate of Calhoun, 44 Cal. 2d 378, 282 P.2d 880 (1955); Matter of Estate of
Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916); Estate of Kruse, 120 Cal. App. 2d 254, 260
P.2d 969 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 641 (1923);
Hester v. Young, 154 Neb. 227, 47 N.W.2d 515 (1951); Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 240
Pac. 991 (1925); Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927); Calhoun v.
Bryant, 28 S.D. 266, 133 N.W. 266 (1911).
28 Cal. Prob. Code § 259.
24 See California cases cited note 22 supra.
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tion of the child's right to inherit from the adoptive parent. As a further
statutory basis, the courts refer to the provision that as a consequence
of adoption the parent-by-blood is relieved of all parental duties and
responsibilities for the adopted child, and in the eyes of the law is no
longer the child's parent.2 5 South Dakota, however, follows a different
theory. In Sorenson v. Churchill,2" the court denied that the right of in-
heritance can be implied from filiation, regarding inheritance as purely
statutory. In both adoptive and natural relationships, it is within the
power of the legislature to deny any succession between the parent and the
child. Emphasizing the contractual element in adoption proceedings, the
court held that the consent given by the parties was decisive on the ques-
tion of inheritance in adoptive filiation.
As a rule the courts will construe the inheritance right of the adopted
child as coextensive with the right of the natural legitimate child towards
his natural legitimate parent. The adopted child takes as if he were born
in lawful wedlock to his adoptive parents. How far this right may be ex-
tended raises problems in the construction of lapse statutes. The issue,
for instance, in Hoellinger v. Molzhon 7 was whether the adopted child
of a legatee could be considered a "lineal descendant" of the adoptive
parent to take the legacy under the lapse statute. The court had no
difficulty considering the child a "lineal descendant" because it liberally
construed adoption as the strict equivalent of natural legitimate filiation.
In the same vein, the existing limitation of heirship in natural relationship
applies to the adopted child. The adopted child may be disinherited and
thus lose his inheritance. The disinheritance must be made with proper
formalities and for cause, subject to the same rules that are applied to the
disinheritance of a natural heir. The court will disregard the disinheri-
tance, and will allow the child to take that part of the estate to which he
is entitled if the adoptive parent fails to observe the same legal require-
ments for the disinheritance of natural heirs.28
These rules would seem to have immediate relevance were inheritance
premised on the filiation established by adoption. But if the inheritance
is based, as in Sorenson v. Churchill, on the consent given in adoption, it
is doubtful whether these rules will be found controlling by the court. The
contract theory of Sorenson implies that the inheritance right of the
child could be lesser or greater than the natural legitimate child of the
adoptive parent, as may be agreed upon at the time of adoption. Although
it seems normal to give the adopted child a lesser right than that of a nat-
25 Matter of Estate of Darling, supra note 22.
26 Supra note 22. See also Calhoun v. Bryant, supra note 22.
2T' 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950).
28 Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 641 (1923).
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ural legitimate child, it seems extraordinary to give that child rights greater
than those of a natural heir. This result cannot be supported by the argu-
ment that the law allows a similar result in marriage. Although an analogy
exists between adoption and marriage in that both have a contractual
element and each relationship is created at the initiative of the parties,
yet some legal rights exist which a party may freely contract away in mar-
riage but not in adoption. Public policy cannot sanction, for instance, an
agreement whereby the adoptive parent waives his right to disinherit an
adopted child, whereas a marriage settlement can practically accomplish
this result. Inheritance supported on the theory of consent loses the dis-
tinctive element of expectancy and acquires the character of a right
founded on contract. The consent theory opens possibilities which can
never be available to the natural legitimate heirs of the adoptive parent.
Hester v. Younge raised an issue actually involving these considerations.
The question put to the court was whether the adopted child could recover
property lawfully disposed of by the adoptive parents on the ground that
it was understood at the time of adoption that the child would take this
property. The court upheld the right of the parents to dispose of their
property freely during their lifetime without interference from prospective
heirs. The court refused to go as far as the adopted child had urged, ruling
that the rights of the adopted child are subject to the same limitations as
exist in natural filiation. The adopted child's right of inheritance could not
extend to property already lawfully disposed of by the adoptive parent.
The courts are in less agreement where the adoptive parent claims suc-
cession from the adopted child. The majority is extremely conscious of
the philanthropic objective of adoption which to them justifies the in-
testate claims of the adopted child to the estate of the adoptive parent.
When the adopted child's estate is in question, the courts have difficulty
overcoming the philanthropic rationale so as to recognize the right of
heirship in the adoptive parent. They are sensitive to the fact that it is
the child who has been adopted, and that to allow the adoptive parent to
succeed presents the appearance of material benefit to the parent, who
has always been considered a voluntary benefactor. The willingness to
derive the successional arrangement from the adoption, as it is done in
the rights of the child, gives way in the face of this consideration. Even
the principle of reciprocity sometimes loses its immediate relevance; the
courts feel bound to insist that adoption statutes should not modify
the usual rules of succession in the natural family 0 They are hesitant to
29 154 Neb. 227, 47 N.W.2d 515 (1951).
80 Gamble v. Cloud, 263 Ala. 336, 82 So. 2d 526 (1955); Franklin v. White, 263 Ala.
223, 82 So. 2d 247 (1955).
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include the right of inheritance in the rights and duties transferred from
the natural parent to the adoptive parent in the adoption process. For
the courts to allow the adoptive parent to participate in the intestate
estate of the child, the statute must clearly and explicitly recognize the
heirship right."'
The California courts have reached a different result by applying the
principle of reciprocity. In Estate of Jobsone the court said that this fun-
damental principle of descent and distribution could not be disregarded
where the adopted child's estate is contested. Whatever rule is applied with
respect to the right of succession must apply to both parties to the adop-
tion. The court concluded that the adoptive parents were entitled to in-
herit as parents because in California the adopted child inherits from
the adoptive parents. The same result has been reached by South Dakota
on the basis of the consent theory. The consent given by the natural
parents to the adoption divests them of successional rights, which are then
transferred to the adoptive parents along with other family rights and
duties.',
Bastards given in adoption present another problem in the view of the
courts. Under common law, the bastard is "filius nullius"; he cannot be
succeeded by his putative parents even in the absence of adoption. Since
no conflict of rights between the natural and adoptive parents exists in
the case of bastards, the courts are inclined to accept the adoptive parents
as heirs of the adopted bastard.84
The civil-law areas are decidedly more conservative; adoption is
ordinarily considered as a limited civil filiation between the adopted child
and adoptive parent. The adopted child has the status of a child of the
adoptive parent, taking as any legitimate child. Where a forced portion is
provided by law the child sometimes takes an equivalent forced share, al-
though some jurisdictions allow the child a share not exceeding that part
of the estate of which the adoptive parent may freely dispose by will. 5
The inheritance benefits extend only to the adopted child, and exception-
ally to his descendants; the adoptive parent cannot inherit from the
adopted child or his descendants.86
The French legislation, perhaps the most progressive civilian adoption
31 Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 240 Pac. 991 (1925).
82 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938 (1912).
8 Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927).
84 See Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 190 Pac. 1020 (1920).
85 Que. Rev. Stat. c. 324, § 18 (1914) (Can.). See also Braz. Civ. Code art. 377(2).
36 See Ley No. 13.252, art. 16; B.G.B. § 1759; Codice Civile art. 304. Brazil confers upon
the adoptive parent the limited right to inherit from the adopted child which is subordinate
to the claims of the 3iatural parents of the adopted child. Brazil Civ. Code art. 1609. See
also Mex. Civ. Code art. 1620; Que. Rev. Stat. c. 324, § 18 (941) (Can.).
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law (excepting Louisiana's which follows the common-law pattern), de-
serves brief examination. The adoption law of France was introduced in
the reform of 1939. This reform was provoked by the unpopularity of
adoption under articles 320 to 342 of the Code Napoleon. From 1876 to
1880 only 192 adoptions per year were reported, and in 1900 only 50
adoptions were contracted.s7 The present law distinguishes between two
kinds of adoption according to their effects. Ordinary adoption is the
adoption known before the 1939 reform and does not affect the ties of the
adopted child with his original family. Extraordinary adoption causes
the severance of the relationship of the adopted child with his blood
kindred.38 France has also an institution known as "adoptive legitima-
tion," a remarkable innovation of the 1939 reform. 9 Those who con-
ceived this institution intended to establish a form of adoption which con-
ferred on the adopted child not the status of an adopted child as generally
known but the status of a legitimate child.4'
As mentioned, in ordinary adoption the adopted child maintains his
original ties with his blood relatives. But aside from duties and rights in
the natural family, he acquires privileges arising from the adoptive rela-
tionship.4" In extraordinary adoption, the child abandons his ties with his
blood relations except for the prohibition of the code on incestuous mar-
riage existing before adoption.' As far as family relationship is concerned,
he is assimilated into the family of the adoptive parent. The members
of the natural family are even prohibited from visiting the adopted child.4"
This prohibition was introduced because of the recognition of the disas-
trous effect upon the success of the adoption of maintaining the original
ties of the adopted child. It was realized that these ties are a hindrance to
the usefulness of adoption because of the influence retained by the
natural relations of the child. Indeed, it was for this reason that the
public had given a cold reception to the institution of adoption before this
innovation.4 However, in both kinds of adoption the same successional
rights from the adoptive parent exist; the child cannot succeed beyond
87 For details, see Gehrunger, Die Adoption im deutschen und franzbsischen Recht (1957) ;
Gamiilscheg, "Das neue franzbsische Adoptionsrecht," 18 Zeitschrift ffir auslgndisches und
internationales Privatrecht 507 (1953).
38 1 Marty & Raynaud, Droit civil 998 (1956).
39 Gehrunger, supra note 37, at 89-95.
40 It is disputed whether this institution is adoption or legitimation. This question has
theoretical value, but practical questions of construction are also involved, e.g., whether the
general provisions on adoption should be applied to adoptive legitimation. The prevailing
opinion is that the institution is a class of adoption. Gehrunger, supra note 37, at 89-90.
41 Code Civil art. 351.
42 Code Civil art. 352.
48 See authorities cited at note 37 supra.
44 1 Marty & Raynaud, supra note 38, at 1000.
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them. 5 The adoptive parents, on the other hand, have a personal and
limited right of succession to the estate of the adopted child. They or
their heirs take only that which the adopted child has received from the
adoptive parents by way of donation or succession.6
In adoptive legitimation article 370 of the Code stipulates that the child
is no longer a member of the original family except for the prohibition on
marriage. He acquires the status of a legitimate child in the adoptive
family. The Code requires that the child to be adopted (legitimated) by
this system should be one whose parents are dead or unknown, or that
the child must have been abandoned. According to article 370 the adopted
child succeeds to the adoptive parents and the adoptive parents succeed
to the adopted child. Thus the effects of adoptive legitimation go beyond
the usual parent and child adoptive relationship as most civil-law countries
understand it, though not as completely as the innovations introduced in
many common-law jurisdictions.
IV
INHERITANCE BETWEEN THE CHILD AND ITS NATURAL KINDRED
The adoptive parents and the natural kindred of the adopted child,
more often than not, are mutually exclusive in most jurisdictions. Al-
though many jurisdictions retain the rule that the adopted child can suc-
ceed by intestacy from his original family, the trend of recent legislation
on the subject is to deny this right. This progressive development, notice-
able in common-law jurisdictions, is only suggested in civil-law jurisdic-
tions.
The principle of reciprocity has a special significance to this aspect
of the successional arrangement, particularly where the adopted child is
still recognized as an intestate heir of the natural parents. California's
use of the doctrine of reciprocity to establish the successional rights of the
adoptive parent is rather exceptional; the doctrine has served more as a
convenient argument for excluding the adoptive parents, affirming the
claim of the natural parents and kindred. This doctrine has been most
influential in arresting the progressive development of a rational formula
of distribution.
Most jurisdictions in common-law areas have statutes expressly pro-
hibiting the child from sharing in the intestate estate of his natural
parent. Although ordinarily this rule also applies toward the other
45 Code Civil art. 356.
46 Code Civil art. 357.
47 23 jurisdictions have this prohibition towards the parents. Only 12 states in the United
States still grant this right, whereas 17 do not regulate this aspect of the succession ex-
pressly.
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natural kindred of the child, some jurisdictions provide a stricter rule
toward them than the natural parents.48 The majority does not consider
the natural parents and kindred as heirs of the child when the adopted
child dies intestate and the natural kindred survive him.4" In the few
jurisdictions where the natural parent may still inherit, the right is con-
ditional. For instance, in Arkansas and Maine an inheritance right is
recognized only as to those properties acquired from the natural parents
and kindred; in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire the right
is limited to properties acquired by the child from the natural parents
and kindred by way of gift, will, or inheritance; whereas Michigan pro-
vides a narrower rule by confining the source of the properties to inherit-
ance. New York's law gives another typical situation where the right is
still retained by natural parents.0 As a rule, the adopted child's right of
inheritance from and through his natural parents terminates upon the
issuance of the order of adoption, except in cases where the natural par-
ent remarries and consents to the adoption of the child by the spouse.
The succession is confined to the natural children of the adoptive parents
and the adopted child and their distributees, leaving the natural parents
without right in the child's property.
The judicial formula regarding the inheritance arrangement between
the adopted child and his natural kindred is considerably less broad than
the legislative formula. In those jurisdictions where the child's heirship
right from the natural parents and kindred is not expressly regulated,
the prevailing view still is to recognize this right. 1 The courts are unable
to see that the existence of this right is inconsistent with the child's com-
plete assimilation to the adoptive family. Again, the primacy of consan-
guinity in inheritance arrangements plays a prominent role. The judicial
development in the state of Washington illustrates this point. The present
Washington law expressly excludes the natural parents and kindred of
the adopted child from succession. 52 The child is considered to be per-
48 Towards other blood relatives, 9 American states recognize the child's heirship right,
25 deny the right, whereas 17 give no regulation. Thus, of the 12 American states that allow
the natural parents to succeed (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Maine,
Michigan, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont), 3 states will not allow the child to take from
the collateral and lineal relatives of his own blood (Florida, Michigan and Rhode Island).
49 31 jurisdictions have such statutes. However, 15 jurisdictions have no regulation of
this inheritance aspect.
50 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117 (effective March 1, 1964).
51 See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951); Estate of Wilson, 95
Colo. 159, 33 P.2d 969 (1934); Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 147 Pac. 693 (1915); Lefkoff
v. Sicro, 189 Ga. 554, 6 S.E.2d 687 (1939); In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d
24 (1945); Billings v. Head, 184 Ind. 361, 111 N.E. 177 (1916); Bartram v. Holcomb, 109
Kan. 87, 187 Pac. 192 (1921); Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927);
In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946); In re Harrington's Estate, 96
Utah 252, 85 P.2d 630 (1938); Matter of Estate of Roderick, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325
(1930).
52 Wash. Rev. Code § 26.32.140 (1961).
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fectly engrafted into the family of his adoptive parent and in the same
position as any legitimate child of the adoptive parent.53 He enjoys all
the rights and privileges, as well as duties, of a legitimate child of the
adoptive parent.54 However, the statute fails to divest the adopted child
of any right enjoyed in the natural family before adoption. The statute
was construed strictly, being in derogation of the common law, and the
courts held that the right of succession of the adopted child from his
natural family was undisturbed. Its denial, the court concluded, could not
be inferred in the absence of any express legislative declaration to this
effect.55
Most courts, despite protestations to the contrary, are actually assum-
ing that the natural filiation still exists after adoption, and for this reason,
the original family and inheritance rights of the child cannot be termi-
nated. South Dakota56 and Utah" hold that natural parents cannot suc-
ceed the adopted child because of their consent to the adoption. They
point out that on the other hand, the adopted child, the person princi-
pally affected by the transaction, has no choice and gives no consent. In
fact, no one consents for him; he should not, therefore, lose the right to
inherit from his natural parent. Although control over him passes to the
adoptive parent, the court insists that he does not cease to be the issue
of his natural parents.
The courts generally consider the adopted child as possessing the same
rights in the natural family as if no adoption had taken place. In Wiley
v. Lawton,5" the children of a divorcee by her first husband were adopted
by the second husband. The court, admitting that the natural father was
deprived of all rights and control over the children, held that the natural
father still had the ultimate liability for their support. Besides, the chil-
dren retained their right of inheritance from him. Another court allowed
the adopted child, as "child" of the natural parent, to prosecute an action
for the recovery of damages arising from the wrongful death of his
natural father.59 In testate succession, the adopted child still enjoys the
protection of the pretermission provision with respect to his natural par-
ent's will. If the natural father fails either to disinherit the child expressly
or mention him in his will, the court will entertain an action by the child
to annul the will and consider the natural father as having died intestate.60
53 Matter of Estate of Hebb, 134 Wash. 424, 235 Pac. 974 (1925).
54 Matter of Estate of Masterson, 108 Wash. 307, 183 Pac. 93 (1919).
55 Matter of Estate of Roderick, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325 (1930).
56 Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927).
57 See Utah cases cited note 51 supra.
58 8 Ill. App. 2d 344, 132 N.E.2d 34 (1956).
59 Macon, D. & S. R.R. v. Porter, 195 Ga. 40, 22 S.E.2d 818 (1942) ; Macon, D. & S. R.R.
v. Porter, 68 Ga. App. 462, 23 S.E.2d 280 (1942).
60 See Matter of Estate of Roderick, supra note 55.
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The courts' reliance on the filiation theory creates the awkward situa-
tion of dual filiation. The concurrence of the adoptive filiation with
natural filiation in the person of the adopted child gives the child the
right to a dual inheritance, a right which the natural legitimate child does
not possess. Dual inheritance challenges the courts to advance a defen-
sible rationale for this preferential treatment received by the adopted
child. The rationale must be sufficiently compelling to support the gro-
tesque results reached by following the logic of dual filiation. In Kansas,
Bartram v. Holcomb61 went so far as to recognize that a grandchild
adopted by his grandfather may take twice from the same decedent,
first in his capacity as adopted child, and second, by representation
through his natural mother, as natural grandchild. If the estate of the
adopted child is under liquidation, Kansas courts have proposed an equally
puzzling solution."2 They do not categorically say who succeeds the child
as between the natural and adoptive parents; the estate devolves to the
person who answers the description of surviving parent, whether by na-
ture or by adoption. The Arkansas courts have also been willing to stretch
the logic of dual filiation to make it applicable to cases of multiple adop-
tion. A testator in Arkansas adopted a child which he later gave for re-
adoption to another.63 The court thought a basic analogy existed between
the first adoption and the original natural filiation and concluded that
the adopted child could lawfully succeed from the second as well as the
first adoptive parent. The courts, however, have failed to articulate any
adequate argument for these results.
The courts that reject dual or multiple inheritance are convinced of
its anomaly, but again no sound solution has been fashioned. In fact they
seem unable to realize that dual inheritance is related to dual filiation.
For example, Colorado64 and Indiana65 reject dual inheritance, but allow
the adopted child to inherit as adopted child or natural child at his option.
This solution avoids dual inheritance but has no theoretical basis: the
child still participates in two filiations, although he may not enjoy in-
heritance benefits from both. Furthermore, the adopted child must exer-
cise his option on the death of one parent. The exercise of his option may
then result to his disadvantage since intelligent exercise of the option is
possible only after both sets of parents die. A Massachusetts court has
01 109 Kan. 87, 198 Pac. 192 (1921).
62 Baird v. Yates, 108 Kan. 721, 196 Pac. 1077 (1921).
63 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951). See also Dreyer v. Schrick,
105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 30 (1919); Matter of Estate of Egley, 16 Wash. 2d 681, 134 P.2d
943 (1943) ; d. Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134 Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (1957) ; In re Estate of
Leichtenberg, 7 Ill. 2d 545, 131 N.E.2d 487 (1956).
64 Quintrall v. Goldsmith, supra note 63.
65 Billings v. Head, 184 Ind. 361, 111 N.E. 177 (1916). See also Head v. Leak, 61 Ind.
App. 253, 111 N.E. 953 (1916
1966]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
developed a rationale that disposes of the narrow issue presented in
Bartram v. Holcomb but fails to exclude dual inheritance from persons
beyond adoptive parents or one that results from multiple adoption.66
The court reasoned that when the legislature provided that no person
should by adoption lose his right to inherit from his natural parents or
kindred, this did not mean that "kindred" should include adoptive par-
ents. This provision was intended to save the right of inheritance from
other parties; it applies only to the inheritance of property of some third
person and not of the adoptive parent. There is no need for a saving pro-
vision to prevent injury to the adopted child which is likely to happen in
the adoption of a descendant since the adopted child would invariably
take more as an adopted child than he could by right of representation
through his parents.
This lack of adequate understanding of the problem involved in dual
inheritance is also apparent in the courts that have taken the initiative
of following the legislative development. In accepting the innovation
they do not indicate even an irresolute commitment to the principle that
in adoption only one filiation can consistently be recognized. They do not
realize that dual inheritance is not the ultimate evil but simply the result
of not fully equating adoption with natural filiation. Nevertheless, legis-
lative policy against dual inheritance provides for liberal courts a start-
ing point for progressive, if sadly disorganized, development. Missouri,
for example, originally accepted dual inheritance; 67 the repudiation of
dual inheritance did not come until the legislature" declared that adop-
tion should not be an instrumentality for dual inheritance.69 This policy
has also suggested the necessity of accepting the rule that the adopted
child should be removed from his natural family. If the child is omitted
in the will of his natural parents or relatives, he cannot, as it was in
former laws, be termed a "pretermitted" child.70 The Pennsylvania courts
have also waited for a favorable legislative climate. Before the legislative
changes in 1917 and 1947, the courts followed the rule that the child's
right from his natural family should subsist.7 1 After these changes, the
courts refused to recognize that the adopted child could prevent a lapse of
66 Delano v. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619, 20 N.E. 308 (1889). For the present law, see Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210, § 7 (1955).
67 Wailes v. Curators of Central College, 363 Mo. 932, 254 S.W.2d 645 (1953); Mississippi
Valley Trust Co. v. Walsh, 360 Mo. 610, 229 S.W.2d 675 (1950); St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. Kaltenbach, 353 Mo. 1114, 186 S.W.2d 578 (1945); Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47,
44 S.W. 761 (1898).
68 Mo. Laws 1917, at 193; cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.090 (1959).
69 Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Walsh, supra note 67.
70 Wailes v. Curators of Central College, supra note 67.
71 Estate of Foley, 1 Wldy. Notes Cas. 301 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1875).
0
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a legacy to his natural father when the natural father predeceased the
testator.72
Pennsylvania courts have, however, occasionally vacillated. The tes-
tator in one case made a bequest to the issues of the natural parent of
an adopted child .7 The court found that the adopted child was included
in the description "issues" of the natural parent and allowed him to take
as instituted heir. The court believed that the case involved testate rather
than intestate succession so that the intestate law did not apply; the only
question was the ascertainment of the instituted heirs, not the right to
take as an heir of the natural parent according to the law of descent.
The courts have also approved the claim of an adopted child for a lower
tax rate on a bequest received from his natural ascendant. One Pennsyl-
vania court thought the favorable tax treatment granted by law to the
"lineal descendants" of the grantor applied to the adopted child.74
California courts have a peculiar rule which is discussed at some
length elsewhere. Briefly, California prohibits the child from succeeding
to the intestate estate of his natural parents. 5 The natural relationship
between the child and his blood parents is superseded because the duties
of the child cannot be owed to two fathers at the same time.76 However,
the adopted child may lawfully succeed to his other lineal and collateral
relatives.
It is more difficult to ascertain the position of the courts in handling
the rights of the natural parents and kindred in the intestate estate of
the adopted child. If the principle of reciprocity were consistently fol-
lowed,71 the rules with respect to the claims of the child upon his natural
kindred would provide a ready solution. But some courts have overlooked
the reciprocity principle, and the arguments they have at times advanced
in rejecting the child's claim seem to suggest that the natural kindred is
excluded. The consent theory in Sorenson v. Churchill7" justifies the ex-
clusion of the natural parents, since they have given consent to the adop-
tion. Within the ambit of this theory the court can insist that death of
the adoptive parents before the opening of the succession of the adopted
72 Ericsson Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 110 (Orphans' Ct. 1955).
78 Taylor's Estate, 57 Pa. D. & C. 311 (Orphans' Ct. 1946). See also Howlett Estate, 366
Pa. 293, 77 A.2d 390 (1951).
74 Scott Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 46 (Orphans' Ct. 1953).
75 Matter of Estate of Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916). See also Estate of
Esposito, 57 Cal. App. 2d 859, 135 P.2d 167 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Estate of Hampton, 55
Cal. App. 2d 543, 131 P.2d 565 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Matter of Estate of Hunsicker, 65
Cal. App. 114, 223 Pac. 411 (Dist. Ct. App. 1923).
76 Matter of Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938 (1912).
77 Bittner Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 263 (Orphans' Ct. 1954).
78 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927).
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child does not have the effect of restoring the right of the natural parents
to succeed to the adopted child.79 But this theory cannot be utilized to
support the exclusion of the other natural kindred of the child who are
regularly not parties to the adoption. Where natural kindred, other than
the natural parents, are involved, a court must choose between two alter-
natives: to recognize the succession of the other kindred or to fashion a
new rationalization for excluding them. In either case, the court is in an
awkward position. This was exactly the dilemma of the California courts.
They were anxious to exclude the natural parents from the adopted child's
inheritance, but did not use the consent theory, relying instead on the
principle of reciprocity which they thought applied between the child and
the adoptive parent. The courts thought that the California statute was
not intended to affect the relationship of any person other than that of
the parents by blood, the adoptive parent, and the child, and were re-
luctant to construe adoption as a filiation with effects extending beyond
the immediate parties. As a consequence, to its grandparents by blood, the
child continues to be a grandchild and the child of his natural parents.
The child neither acquires new relations nor loses his blood relations."0
Estate of Calhoun"' shows the difficulty in this distinction. The inte-
state estate of the adopted child was contested between the natural broth-
ers and sisters of the adopted child and the natural children of the adop-
tive parent (his brothers and sisters by adoption). The court ruled that
the right of succession of the natural relatives of the child excluded all
other claimants in the adoptive relationship, in consonance with the rule
that the adopted child remains a relative and heir of his natural relatives
other than his natural parents, and that these natural relatives were con-
versely the heirs of the intestate child. It seems strange that adoption
can terminate the more immediate and close tie between the adopted
child and his natural parents without altering the more distant and de-
tached tie between the child and his other ancestral and collateral rela-
tives.
Most courts that grant the child heirship rights from his kindred also
allow these kindred to inherit from the child. The estate of the adopted
child in Alabama was contested between the adoptive parents and the
natural brothers and sisters of the decedent adopted child.,, It was
clear to the court that the natural parents of the adopted child would
have been the heirs had they not predeceased the adopted child. The
claim of the adoptive parents was dismissed and the court declared that
79 In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378 (1914).
80 Estate of Esposito, supra note 75.
81 44 Cal. 2d 378, 282 P.2d 880 (1955).
82 Franklin v. White, 263 Ala. 223, 82 So. 2d 247 (1955).
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as between them and the natural brothers and sisters of the adopted child,
the blood relatives had a preferential right to succeed to these properties
which would have devolved upon the natural parents. In Carter Oil Co.
v. Norman,"8 the court stood by this principle notwithstanding the pro-
vision of the law that the adoptive parent could not inherit any property
which the child may have taken by gift from his kindred by blood. The
court said that this provision was not intended to give the adoptive parent
the general right to inherit as natural parent; rather, it intended only to
give to the adoptive parents the right to inherit the property which they
had given to the adopted child. 4
Other courts have special rules governing the inheritance rights of the
kindred. Some rules attempt to allocate the intestate estate by placing
the adoptive parents in the adopted child's line of intestate succession.
The premise is that the order of heirship of the adopted child is that ob-
taining in the natural family, except that the adoptive parents come in at
some point in the order of preference. In Colorado, the adoptive parents
are preferred heirs of the child, excluding all other blood kindred.5 But
if the adoptive parents are in default to take, or if they have predeceased
the child, then the natural parents and other relatives of the adopted
child, in the order provided by law for usual succession, enter the suc-
cession."6 This scheme is also varied by expanding the circle of adoptive
relatives who have preferences over the natural parents and kindred. For
instance, under the Iowa Code of 1934, it has been held that the right of
the natural parents to succeed was subordinate to the successional right
of the ancestral and collateral heirs of the adoptive parents, and the adop-
tive parents themselves.17 The court relied on the reciprocity principle
since the adopted child under certain conditions could inherit from his
uncles, aunts and cousins by adoption.
Another common judicial solution paralleling statutory rules in some
jurisdictions is to divide the estate of the child according to its source.
The aim is to prevent the transfer of the properties from the natural
stream to the adoptive stream so as to avoid the situation where the adop-
tive parents and their kindred indirectly inherit from the natural kindred
of the adopted child, or vice versa. The property which the adopted
88 131 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1942) (construing an Illinois statute).
84 An amendment in 1955 did not alter the rule, except to make some verbal changes. See
Ill. Laws 1955, at 288.
85 Coffman v. Howell, 111 Colo. 359, 141 P.2d 1017 (1943); Estate of Warr, 111 Colo.
85, 137 P.2d 408 (1943).
88 Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 147 Pac. 693 (1915).
87 In re Smith, 277 N.W. 743 (Iowa 1938). See also In re Estate of Fitzgerald, 223 Iowa
141, 272 N.W. 117 (1937).
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child acquired from the natural parents reverts to them, whereas all other
property is distributed to the adoptive parents."
The provocative variation of inheritance arrangements in the common-
law jurisdictions does not exist in the civil-law countries. The theory of
adoption and succession in Roman law as modified by Justinian, the
adoptio minus plena, has here its strongest influence; almost invariably,
the Roman rule that the adopted child could succeed from his original
family obtains. The civilian areas thus almost universally recognize the
capacity of the child to receive a dual inheritance.
The practice in civil-law areas in the problems of multiple adoption
seems more desirable than that employed in many common-law jurisdic-
tions. The civil-law countries generally prohibit the re-adoption of the
child while the first adoption continues. The basic idea behind the rule
has been extended to cases where natural descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate, exist. The situation in which the natural descendants of the
adoptive parents compete with the adopted child in the succession of the
adoptive parent rarely occurs because the law in the civil-law areas pro-
hibits one from adopting a child if he has natural descendants. As a
consequence, the confusion that arises from multiple adoption in the
common-law areas has not appeared in the civil law.
Although most countries proceed from the principle of reciprocity to
constitute the natural kindred of the adopted child his heirs, some in-
teresting variations on statutory regulation of the right of the natural
kindred exist. Generally, inheritance by the child's natural relatives is
regulated by a broad provision exemplified by section 1764 of the German
Civil Code: "The rights and obligations arising from the filiation of the
child with his natural relatives are not affected by the adoption except as
otherwise provided by law."8 Quebec law established a different scheme:
the property acquired by gift, will, or inheritance from the child's natural
relatives devolves in the same way as if he had not been adopted, whereas
those acquired by the child himself, or by gift, will or inheritance from
the adoptive family are distributed to the heirs within this family. 0
In both schemes the order of preference and shares is regulated by the
general rules of inheritance. Brazil sets up another arrangement but only
when no legitimate descendant can inherit. In the ordinary succession
88 Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274 (1884). But see Barnhizel v. Ferrell, 47 Ind. 335
(1874); Dunn v. Means, 48 Ind. App. 383, 95 N.E. 1015 (1911). Humphries v. Davis par-
tially overruled Barnhizel v. Ferrell. Cf. the Iowa rule announced in Baker v. Clowser, 158
Iowa 156, 138 N.W. 837 (1912), calling the Humphries distinction "anomalous."
89 Author's translation. See also Ley No. 13.242, art. 14; Braz. Civil Code art. 1574;
Codice Civile 300; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 214 (West 195); Mex. Civ. Code art. 1620.90 Que. Rev. Stat. c. 324, §§ 18(2)(a)-(b) (1941) (Can.).
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all legitimate ascendants in the natural line are next in order to succeed,"
but the legitimate ascendants qualified to succeed the adopted child are
confined first to natural parents of the child. Beyond the natural parents,
the other ascendants can no longer take. The adoptive parents, if they
survive, are then called to the intestate succession, taking the whole of
the estate to the exclusion of other heirs. 2 The other ascendants in the
natural blood line of the adopted child only enter the succession in the
absence or incapacity of the adoptive parents. Mexico, on the other hand,
considers the natural and adoptive parents as heirs with equal rights.
In case both of them survive the adopted child, the estate of the child
is divided equally between them regardless of the source of the property
composing the estate of the child.93
The French regulation relies more on the principle of reciprocity. In
ordinary adoption where the child remains an heir to his natural kindred,
the natural kindred also maintain their heirship right from the child
after adoption. In extraordinary adoption, the child appears to have
undergone some form of legal disinheritance so that he may no longer
take in the intestate estate of his blood relations.94 Consequently, the
natural relatives of the child are cut off. The effect of adoptive legitima-
tion is to constitute the adopted child a truly legitimate child of the
adoptive parent. He cannot take as heir of his natural family, and his
blood relations are disqualified to succeed him even if they happen to
know the child after adoption.95
INHERITANCE BETWEEN THE CHILD AND KEL I OF THE
ADOPTIVE PARENTS
Consistent with the idea of making the child a/full member of the
adoptive family, current legislation in common-law jurisdictions has
tended to liberalize inheritance between the child "and his adoptive rela-
tives. However, some strong opposition remains to retard the progress in
this area. Because of this opposition the Uniform Adoption Act as now
worded leaves the solution of this problem to local policy.96 The oppo-
91 Braz. Civ. Code art. 1603 (2).
92 Braz. Civ. Code art. 1609.
93 Mex. Civ. Code art. 1620.
94 1 Marty & Raynaud, Droit civil 1007 (1956).
95 Code Civil art. 370. Louisiana's grant of inheritance to the adopted child from his
natural kindred, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 214.4 (West 1952), has been made because of some
opinion that to abolish it violates the constitutional prohibition against the abolition of
forced heirship. See Bugea, "Adoption in Louisiana-Its Past, Present, Future," 3 Loyola
L. Rev. 1 (1945).
96 For a detailed discussion, see Merrill & Merrill, "Towards Uniformity in Adoption
Law," 40 Iowa L. Rev. 299, 319 (1955).
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sition in civil-law countries is more intense and most of these jurisdic-
tions, except to a limited degree Louisiana and France, remain attached
to the antiquated idea that inheritance should remain within the natural
family. Even in France, the progressive measures of the 1939 reform
were not attained without difficulty; in Louisiana a new approach to the
problem is regarded with reservation.
Questions of succession involving the adopted child and relatives of
the adoptive parent are numerous, but the discussion here is limited to
developments establishing a filiation between the child and the adoptive
parents' relatives.
A majority of the common-law jurisdictions grant mutual succession
between the adopted child and the relatives of the adoptive parent.
97
Unfortunately, almost as many states provide no detailed regulation of
this problem." Only a negligible number of the state statutes explicitly
prohibit this inheritance relationship between the adopted child and the
adoptive parent's relatives.99
The courts in interpreting the general provisions on adoption in ques-
tions of inheritance between the adopted child and the adoptive parent's
relatives have developed various rules of limited usefulness. To ascertain
these rules, it is sufficient to study the rulings on the rights of the adopted
child. The rights of the adoptive parents' relatives follow more or less
those of the adoptive parents; also, the rule applicable to the child is
often extended to relatives of the adoptive parents on reciprocity.
97 27 jurisdictions allow the adopted child to succeed from the lineal relatives of the
adoptive parent, 26 from a collateral. In return, 22 jurisdictions allow the lineal relatives to
share in the intestate distribution of the adopted child's estate, and about the same number
allow the collaterals to share. Some states confine the right to certain lineal descendants.
For instance, in Florida, Tennessee and Vermont, the inheritance is limited between the
natural and adopted children of the adoptive parent and their descendants; Maine and
Massachusetts grant the right of heirship only to lineal descendants of the adoptive parent;
New York allows reciprocal inheritance between the adopted and natural children of the
adoptive parent and their distributees, whereas Mississippi recognizes only the children of
the adoptive parent.
98 19 jurisdictions fail to regulate the inheritance between the child and lineal relatives;
whereas 23 jurisdictions have no rules respecting collateral relatives of the adoptive parent.
The Ontario adoption law provides an illustration of such regulation:(1) For all purposes the adopted child, upon the adoption order being made, becomes
the child of the adopting parent and the adopting parent becomes the parent of the
adopted child as if the adopted child had been born in lawful wedlock to the adopting
parent.(2) For all purposes the adopted child, upon the adoption order being made, ceases
to be the child of the person who was his parent before the adoption order was made
and that person ceases to be the parent of the adopted child.
(3) The relationship to one another of all persons, whether the adopted child, the
adopting parent, the kindred of the adopting parent, the parent before the making of
the adoption order and the kindred of that parent or any other person, shall be de-
termined in accordance with subsections 1 and 2.
Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 53, § 76 (1960) (Can.).
99 The author has found statutes in only two American jurisdictions. See Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 19, § 535 (1964); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 448 (Supp. 1965).
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The courts' conservative attitude towards adoption is accentuated by
the solutions they have fashioned in this area. For the courts to approve
any flow of property through inheritance between the adopted child and
the relations of the adoptive parent, a more thorough and liberal under-
standing of adoption must be developed than that used to justify the
inheritance between the adopted child and the adoptive parent. The
philanthropic objective of adoption may support the inheritance between
the adopted child and the adoptive parent, but it seems irrelevant in the
current context since the relatives of the adoptive parent have no interest
in the adoption proceeding. In fact, this lack of interest appears to be
the strongest consideration which psychologically motivates the courts
to view the inheritance between the adopted child and these relatives
without much sympathy. As a South Dakota court pointedly remarked,
the adoptive parent may make a person his heir, but he may not make
the adopted child an heir to persons not parties to the adoption.100 Most
courts, however, either find it difficult or lack the frankness to articulate
this reasoning accurately; the arguments that the courts have frequently
used seem to lack precision and conviction.
The California courts have held in a long line of cases that the adopted
child cannot inherit from the relatives of the adoptive parent and that
the child is not deprived by the adoption of any right of inheritance that
he may have had from his blood ancestors or collateral relations. 0 1 To
the courts, the rules concerning computation of relationship afford con-
vincing indication that the adopted child may not inherit; the rules
contemplate a consanguinity relationship, and the adopted child cannot
be a relative in this context. They believe that to construe these rules so
as to give to the child heirship rights in the property of the relatives of
the adoptive parent is to force artificial construction into the law.'0 The
Ontario Court of Appeal' 0 3 and the Supreme Court of Canada 0 4 have
advanced a technical argument in a case where the adopted children of the
daughter of the testator claimed that they were "children" of the daugh-
ter within the terms of the will. The will provided that the life interest
of the daughter was to be held in trust after her death for her children
until they came of age, when it was to be divided equally among them.
Both courts ruled that the adopted children were not "children" within
100 In re Eddins' Estate, 66 S.D. 109, 279 N.W. 244 (1938).
101 Matter of Estate of Darling, 73 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916); Estate of Kruse, 120
Cal. App. 2d 254, 260 P.2d 969 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Estate of Grace, 88 Cal. App. 2d
956, 200 P.2d 189 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Estate of Jones, 3 Cal. App. 2d 395, 39 P.2d 847
(Dist. Ct. App. 1934).
102 Matter of Estate of Pence, 117 Cal. App. 323, 4 P.2d 202 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
103 In re Gage, [1961] Ont. 540, [1961] 28 D.L.2d 469 (Ct. App.).
104 In re Gage, [1962] Can. Sup. Ct. 241, [1962] 31 D.L.R.2d 662. But see In re Black-
well, [1959] Ont. 377, [1959] 20 D.L.R.2d 107 (Ct. App.).
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the terms of the will. The courts said that to allow them to take would be
tantamount to confiscation by the state and distribution by the state of
the property confiscated.
Other courts make an emotional appeal to the principle of con-
sanguinity in descent and distribution. Estate of Wart °5 in Colorado ap-
plied this concept to an interesting set of facts; the deceased died
intestate without descendants and the only relatives surviving her were
her cousins and the adopted daughter of a predeceased brother. There
was no dispute that the adoptive parent of the adopted daughter would
have taken the whole estate to the exclusion of the cousins had he not
predeceased the decedent. If the adopted daughter could represent her
father, she would exclude the cousins. The court, however, concluded that
she could not take by representation, holding that the cousins took to the
exclusion of the adopted daughter. On the authority of Russell v. Jor-
dan,'0 6 the court reasoned that under the Colorado statute the adoptive
relation was personal between the adoptive parent and the child; from
this it follows that the rights of third parties, including the right of in-
heritance from remote kin of adoptive parents, should not be affected.
It stressed that the idea that blood relationship always has been funda-
mental in the law of descent and distribution, and that from time im-
memorial it has been held by English-speaking people that intestate
property should descend to the kindred of the blood. The Colorado
courts adhered firmly to this reasoning even after the adoption statute
on which Russell v. Jordan was based was amended to allow the adoptive
family to inherit from the adopted child. The court construed the amend-
ment to mean that the adopted child cannot be considered an issue of the
adoptive parent so as to be entitled to inherit from persons other than
the adoptive parent, although the relatives of the adoptive parent could
lawfully inherit from the adopted child.10
7
The sterile argument that the law provides no express authority for
affirming any inheritance rights in the child from the relatives of the
adoptive parent is also current. In a New York case,10 8 the contestant
petitioned for a right to inherit from the sister of her adoptive father.
The court rejected her claim despite legislative enactments defining and
105 ill Colo. 85, 137 P.2d 408 (1943).
106 58 Colo. 445, 147 Pac. 693 (1915).
107 Coffman v. Howell, 111 Colo. 359, 141 P.2d 1017 (1943). The rejection of reciprocity
in favor of the child in this situation has also been followed in Michigan. Moritz v. Callen-
der, 291 Mich. 190, 289 N.W. 126 (1939).
108 Matter of Estate of Powell, 112 Misc. 74, 183 N.Y. Supp. 939 (Surr. Ct. Oneida
County 1920). See also Matter of Estate of Hall, 234 App. Div. 151, 254 N.Y. Supp. 564
(3d Dep't 1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 202 App. Div. 606, 195 N.Y. Supp. 605 (4th Dep't
1922).
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enlarging the rights of the adopted child. The court stated it to be well
settled that the adoptive parent and the child may inherit from each other,
but held that no authority sustained the claim of the contestant that she
was an heir of the collateral relatives of the adoptive parent. The adopted
child is not the next of kin of the decedent if the deceased is a relative
of the adoptive parent.109 Michigan courts used the same argument in
rejecting the claim of an adopted child as representative of his adoptive
parent. The general language of the statute convinced the courts that the
child cannot be an heir of the adoptive parent's kindred in his own right,
much less by representation."0 Pursuing this argument further in an-
other case,"" a Michigan court found the adopted child unjustly enriched.
The adopted child of a predeceased brother of the decedent had received
the properties under claim of heirship. The blood relatives of the decedent
who had earlier believed the adopted child to be the decedent's heir-at-
law contested the succession when they discovered that the law does not
establish the child's right. The court held the child liable for the amount
inherited on his other properties because his failure to restore the proper-
ties wrongly received from the estate constituted unjust enrichment.
The general language of the adoption laws leaves the courts a real
choice whether or not to establish any inheritance relationship. Arguing
on the basis of the generality of the statutes only disguises the court's
motive. An increasing number of courts are departing from this traditional
hostility to the interest of the adopted child in the estate of relatives of
the adoptive parent, even in the face of general language in the adoption
statutes. Although the courts are unable to articulate a common rationale,
it is obvious that the desire to absorb the adopted child completely into
the adoptive family is the primary consideration. The Iowa courts derive
the inheritance right of the child from the adoptive parent's relatives
from the filiation created by adoption; by reciprocity, the courts allow
the relatives of the adoptive parent to inherit from the child." 2 In almost
the same way, the Nebraska courts assert that the child should be able
to succeed from the relatives of the adoptive parent, because one of the
most significant rights or privileges of a child of lawful wedlock is the
right of mutual succession, and apply this rule within the adoptive family
109 Matter of Will of Charles, 200 Misc. 452, 102 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County
1951). New York has, however, recognized inheritance between the adopted child and the
natural children of the adoptive parent. Matter of Estate of Whitcomb, 170 Misc. 579, 10
N.Y.S.2d 824 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1939); N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 117.
110 Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146, 100 N.W. 278 (1904).
Il" Moritz v. Horsman, 305 Mich. 627, 9 N.W.2d 868 (1943).
112 Cook v. Estate of Todd, 249 Iowa 1274, 90 N.W.2d 23 (1958) ; In re Estate of Fitz-




including the adoptive parent's relatives.' The general language of the
statute also presents no difficulty in Kentucky. The Kentucky courts
believe that the provision that the child shall be deemed for purposes of
inheritance a child born out of wedlock to the adoptive parents is compre-
hensive enough to allow the child to inherit not only from but through the
adoptive parent as a natural legitimate child." 4
North Dakota has advanced a very sweeping argument which defines
adoption in more precise terms.115 In upholding the right of the adopted
children as "lineal descendants" under a lapse statute, the court argued
that the relationship created by adoption is applicable against the world
so that inheritance by the adopted child from the adopting parent should
be considered established as if the child had been born to the adoptive
parents in lawful wedlock. It pointed out that the intention of the legisla-
ture as it could be deduced from the statute was to place the adopted
child insofar as possible in the same position as the natural child. This,
the court concluded, is always the intent of adoptive parents.
The reasoned refusal of a California appellate court to follow the con-
servative rule expressed in a long line of cases raises hope that the courts
can be induced to change their attitude." 6 The court remarked that the
legislative and social attitude toward adoption exhibits a purpose to sub-
stitute the adoptive family for the natural family in all respects, and,
as a consequence, to confine the inheritance within the adoptive family.
The court showed an awareness of the development of legislation in re-
cent years, and of the reality that the adopted children come generally
from broken homes. It pointed out that changes in the birth records of
adopted children make it exceedingly difficult in most cases to establish
the relationship of the adopted child to his blood relations.
The position of the civil-law areas can be briefly summarized. Civil-
law jurisdictions consider the adoptive relationship a personal and limited
filiation between the adopted child and the adoptive parent; for this rea-
son, questions of intestate inheritance between the adopted child and the
adoptive parent's natural kindred do not arise. The commonly accepted
rule is that no succession can be recognized between these parties.
Legally, they are strangers to each other and no binding rights or obliga-
113 In re Estate of Taylor, 136 Neb. 227, 285 N.W. 538 (1939).
114 See details in Kolb v. Ruhi's Adm'r., 303 Ky. 604, 198 S.W.2d 326 (1946); Major v.
Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). But in the 1940 statute and all prior laws,
the child was excluded from the succession of the collateral and lineal relatives of the adop-
tive parents. See Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W.2d 680 (1940); Sanders v. Adams,
278 Ky. 24, 128 S.W.2d 223 (1939).
115 Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1990).
116 Estate of Calhoun, 272 P.2d 541 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954). But see the decision of
the Supreme Court of California which reversed the appellate court. Estate of Calhoun, 44
Cal. 2d 378, 282 P.2d 880 (1955).
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tions arising from family relationship can exist." 7 Argentina's regulation
may be taken as representative. The child succeeds neither from any
of the children of the adoptive parent, natural or adopted, nor from the
collateral relatives of the adoptive parent. In the event that the adoptive
parent predeceases his parents, the adopted child cannot claim the right
of succession from the parents or ancestors of the adoptive parent. Since
generally in the civil law not even the adoptive parent may succeed the
child, it is not strange that very often no relative of the adoptive parent
may succeed the child. The German law in fact leaves nothing more to
be said when it declares the spouse of the adoptive parent who did not
participate in the adoption a stranger to the child in spite of marriage to
the adoptive parent."8
Only Louisiana and France have made some constructive deviations
from this classical position. Louisiana has experienced the stress of legis-
•lative reform and inevitably reflects the encouraging developments al-
ready noted. In 1958, article 214 of the Louisiana Civil Code was amended
to provide that the child and his lawful descendants are intestate heirs
of the adoptive parent and his relatives, and these relatives are heirs of
the adopted child and his descendants. The French ordinary and extra-
ordinary adoptions give to the adopted child no inheritance right from
the adoptive parent's relatives; in turn, these relatives are not heirs by
intestacy in the estate of the adopted child." 9 In adoptive legitimation,
the relatives may acquire inheritance rights if they subscribe to the adop-
tion of the child thus binding themselves to the consequences of the
adoption. The subscription to the adoption, in effect, makes the relatives
secondary parties to the adoption. The law also recognizes the right of
the child to take in the intestate estate of the adoptive parents' relatives. 20
VI
A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF THE CURRENT LAW OF DESCENT AND
DISTRIBUTION IN ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS
This study reveals the refusal of most jurisdictions to accommodate
in descent and distribution involving adoptive relationships the same
underlying considerations applied in natural filiation. As a result, the
system of descent and distribution in adoptive relationships follows an
order distinct from that observed in the natural family. Some of the
117 Ley No. 13.252, art. 12; Braz. Civ. Code art. 1618; B.G.B. art. 1753; Codice Civile
art. 500; Mex. Civ. Code art. 1612; Phil. Civil Code 342; Que. Rev. Stat. c. 324, § 18(l)
(1941) (Can.).
118 B.G.B. art. 1757.
119 Code Civil art. 356.
120 Code Civil art. 670.
19661
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
various schemes established for the adoptive relationship lack rational
justification, and, in the main, the present arrangements fail to reflect
the true goal of adoption. The treatment of the problem seems prin-
cipally dictated by antiquated tradition, distorted conception of the func-
tion of adoption, and, to some degree, by the limitations imposed by the
juristic techniques of the two legal systems.
In spite of its increasing popularity, the difficulties in the current sys-
tems of inheritance continue to arrest the full public acceptance of adop-
tion and to frustrate the huge potentialities of adoption to accommodate
numerous problems in domestic relations. Reform is needed to establish
an equitable order of distribution of intestate estates within the adoptive
family consistent with the widely recognized functions of adoption and
succession. In the United States the Uniform Adoption Act was promul-
gated in 1953 but the inheritance provision of the act has been adopted
only in Montana and Oklahoma and partially in Wisconsin. Conflicting
state policies prevented the incorporation in the act of a uniform pro-
vision on the inheritance effects of adoption. The arguments against a
uniform rule, premised on the reorientation of adoption towards a com-
plete assimilation of the adopted child in the adoptive family, uniquely
summarize the thinking of legislatures and of the courts. A brief evalua-
tion of these arguments should be useful to conclude this work.
Although the adopted child is universally allowed to succeed the adop-
tive parent, the adoptive parent is not considered an heir of the intestate
child: the natural parents are generally preferred. This arrangement is
justified on the ground that adoption should be for the exclusive benefit
of the child and not a means for the enrichment of the adoptive parent.
As a corollary, the fear is expressed that allowing the adoptive parent an
inheritance right in the child's estate would invite unscrupulous persons
to adopt children.
Even were this fear valid, it is at once clear that the remedy is not the
denial of successional right but the formulation of adoption procedure
which contains safeguards to exclude such persons. Adoption through
court proceedings which require background investigation of persons
seeking to adopt should do much to remove this problem. But it is ex-
tremely doubtful that this fear is justified. Children given for adoption
are not invitingly rich. In fact, the main reason natural parents put their
children up for adoption is poverty. Most of these children are orphans;
many do not know their parents because they were born out of wedlock
and abandoned by the mother; some are remnants of broken homes. In
the United States more than half of the children adopted in 1951 were
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born out of wedlock; 2 1 their unmarried mothers are young2 2 and find it
difficult to face the stigma of unmarried parenthood.
Of those born in wedlock, the children mostly come from homes
broken by divorce, desertion, or separation. 12 3 Those from unbroken
homes are given for adoption because the parents feel they cannot sup-
port the child; or both parents are ill and unable to take care of the
child; or because the parents had married shortly before or after birth
of the child and could not face the social disapproval of their situa-
tion.2 4 Recent data reveal no change in the status of the children given
for adoption 2
5
The traditional hostility toward the heirship right of the adoptive
parent overlooks factors that must be considered in this question. First,
only the death of a party provokes succession. This establishes the favor-
able probability that the adopted child will end up succeeding the adop-
tive parent. It can be said that in those rare instances where the child
has properties before adoption, the adoptive parent will "benefit" from
121 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 14,"
at 17 (1953).
122 Two out of five unmarried mothers are reported to be teenagers. Ibid.
123 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 14,"
at 8-10 (1953).
124 Id. at 9.
25 The percentage distribution of the status of children adopted by unrelated petitioners
in 1955 is a follows:
Total 100
Born out of wedlock 69
Born in wedlock 31








Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 39," at 7
(1957).
The percentage distribution in 1960 shows a slight increase in children born out of wed-
lock:
Total 100
Born out of wedlock 77
To unmarried women ...................................... 60
To married women ......................................... 10
Not reported .............................................. 7
Born in wedlock 23
One or both parents
dead .................................................... 2
Parents living and to-
gether ................................................... 6
Both parents living, broken
m arriage ................................................ 7
Others & not reported ...................................... 8
Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 66," at 29
(1962).
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the adopted child only in the still rarer instance where he survives the
child. Second, the opposition operates on an assumption inconsistent with
the other effects of adoption that most countries readily concede to the
adoptive parent. For instance, all jurisdictions grant the adoptive parent
the right of custody of the person and management of the properties of
the child during minority. A person unworthy to succeed should be
more than unworthy to assume these rights which concern directly the
child's welfare during the most crucial time of his life.
It is also idle to insist that granting such rights would undermine the
purpose of adoption as an institution primarily for the benefit of the
child. To deny the adoptive parent an incidental benefit when the adopted
child has ceased to enjoy whatever benefit he may have derived from the
relationship is to pursue an exaggerated consistency. To determine who,
between an adoptive parent and the blood parent, is worthy of inheriting
the child's estate is the real issue. The answer cannot be found in axioms
that exclusively emphasize the primacy of consanguinity connections. The
natural relationship is not so sacred that it cannot be overcome in achiev-
ing successful adoption and in accordance with the underlying theory of
modern intestate succession. The great efforts of the adoptive parent to
bring up an unrelated child he considers his own by sincere and en-
lightened conviction, the altruistic motivation and natural desire to be
parent that pervade the adoptive relationship, and the tangible and in-
tangible assistance the adoptive parent bestows upon the child in the
accumulation of his properties more than balance whatever worthiness
to succeed the natural parent can claim on the mere basis of kinship. On
the other hand, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the natural parent has
voluntarily freed himself from the exacting and delicate responsibility
of parenthood, often even unwilling to draw the slightest attention to his
parental connection with the child. Furthermore, it is more defensible to
assume that the adopted child's intention upon his death is to dispose
his properties to the adoptive parent whom he has always thought as
parent throughout his life. It would frustrate the realization of his tacit
will to supplant the adoptive parent with the natural parent at the time
when the material benefits accumulated during adoptive life are under
liquidation. To allow the natural parents to succeed is to override the
decedent's legitimate preference.
Legislatures are inclined to take a hard look at the wisdom of totally
removing the adopted child from his kindred's succession. The historical
reasons for the rule allowing the child to succeed from his natural kindred
are easy enough to overcome. The civil law acquired the rule from Jus-
tinian's innovation, whereas the common law maintains it because of the
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abundant hesitation to abolish blood filiation as a basic assumption of
inheritance right. The broad conception of emancipation together with
the limited nature of legal personality of the child in Roman law justified
Justinian's law. But in the present civilian codes, emancipation no longer
causes disinheritance, and minors-indeed an unborn child in most
jurisdictions-have the capacity to succeed and own properties. The
position of the common law confuses consanguinity as a rough measure
of the decedent's preference with the decedent's preference itself. Besides,
it thoroughly misinterprets the true motive of adoption.-
Studies suggest that the present rule fails to operate often enough to
justify its place as a general rule of descent and distribution. The natural
relatives of the child are often difficult to find not only because they are'
eager to conceal their connections, but also because valid methods of
placement make the reliable ascertainment of the natural relations of the
child extremely difficult. Also, these children are placed and shortly there-
after adopted at a very early age, a majority at an age of less than a
month.12 This age makes it difficult to trace their relations at death. In
the few cases where family connections can be reasonably established,
poverty among the relatives has practically excluded any possible in-
heritance.
The need for a psychological environment that assures successful adop-
tion dictates the complete removal of the child from his natural family.
Maintaining the child's connection with his natural family casts serious
obstacles in the path of achieving mutual affection and responsibility
within the adoptive family. It leaves the child uncertain as to whom he
should treat as "parents." Besides, prospective adoptive parents ob-
viously desire, and are entitled to, a protected privacy and free use of
126 The percentage distribution of the ages at the time of placement of the children
adopted in 1955 and 1960 is as follows:
1955:
Total 100
Under 1 month 50
1 month, under 6 months 13
6 months, under 1 year 6
1 year, under 6 years 22
6 years and over 9




Under 1 month 39
1 month, under 3 months 20
3 months, under 6 months 12
6 months, under 1 year 8
1 year, under 6 years 15
6 years, under 12 years 5
12 years and over 1
Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 66," at 29(1962).
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discretion approximating that of a natural filial relationship. The fact
that children are adopted at an early age hopefully assures full assimila-
tion into the adoptive family before the child reaches the age of discre-
tion. It is extremely doubtful that the child will find it to his advantage,
even at an advanced age, to be continuously exposed to the unfortunate
events that led to his adoption. On this point, a lesson can be learned
from the long experience in France. The unpopularity of adoption under
the Code Napoleon was due to the embarrassment that the natural rela-
tionship caused. 27 As mentioned elsewhere, this provided the initiative
for establishing the concepts of extraordinary adoption and adoptive
legitimation. Reports indicate that despite the irrevocable nature of adop-
tive legitimation, adoptive parents in France prefer this to ordinary or
extraordinary adoption."2 8
Some argue that prohibiting the child from succeeding natural kindred
prevents these kindred from benefiting the child. It is enough to reply
that this need can be satisfied by making the child testate heir in the will
of the relatives.
The inheritance arrangement between the adopted child and the rela-
tives of the adoptive parents evidences the antiquated attitude of most
jurisdictions, especially of the civil-law areas. The civil-law jurisdictions
almost universally oppose the establishment of any legal channels of
interchange of proprietary and family rights between the adopted child
and the relations of the adoptive parent. The conception of adoption as
a limited artificial filiation between the adoptive parent and the child ef-
fectively isolates the child from his adoptive parent's relation. Even the
exception made in France in adoptive legitimation has a thoroughly
restricted usefulness because of the requirement that a subscription to
the adoption by the parent's relatives is necessary. The existing systems
in the common-law areas are so diverse that no valid generalization can
be drawn. Some jurisdictions permit mutual inheritance to all relatives
of the adoptive parent and the child, but many confine the inheritance
to lineal relatives, and a substantial number to legal descendants. A few
states consider the source of the property in the estate determinative,
and others apply the unusual rule that the relatives of the adoptive
parent may be heirs of the child, but the child is not an heir to them.
The existence of an inheritance arrangement clearly shows the belief of
most common-law areas that some form of inheritance arrangement could
be consistently recognized between the parties. The differences present a
complex pattern not so much on the desirability, as on the degree of in-
127 1 Marty & Raynaud, Droit civil 1000, 1007 (1956).
128 See Gehrunger, Die Adoption in deutschen und franz5sischen Recht 89-95 (1957).
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novation acceptable to the states. Since the introduction of novel schemes
of inheritance involves widespread alteration of current systems and a
careful formulation of a new order of heirship and equitable distribution
of shares within the natural family of the adoptive parents, the legislative
development in this field must understandably be guarded. However, the
numerous variations of inheritance arrangement contained in current
laws are definitely an intelligent and discerning experimentation by legisla-
tures in the common-law areas focused on the ultimate acceptance of the
idea of complete assimilation of the adopted child into the new circle of
relatives in the adoptive family.
Few arguments advanced against the establishment of inheritance
rights between the adopted child and the relatives of the adoptive parent
deserve examination. Most earnestly pressed is the point that the adop-
tive parents have a right to adopt a person as their heir but not as an heir
of their relatives. It should be noted that inheritance is not the aim of
adoption. People adopt, as people marry, not with the intention of con-
stituting a person to be an heir of themselves or of their relatives. The
injustice is more apparent than real; it is true that the adoptive parent
adopted a person who may inherit from his relatives, but he also adopted
a person from whom the relatives may inherit. Since inheritance opens
with the death of a party, the relatives have as much chance to inherit
from the adopted child as the child from them. It is also true that some
relatives usually oppose an adoption. But even in this case, exclusion of
mutual right of inheritance cannot be justified. Any opposition is not
based on the desire of relatives to exclude the child as their heir; rather,
they hope to exclude the child from the estate of the adoptive parent.
Their opposition is, therefore, contrary to the intentions of the adoptive
parent, and overreaches the limits of the right of these relatives in the
estate of the adoptive parent as a mere expectancy. If the relatives have
reason to oppose the child's taking in their estate, they are not without
effective remedy; the right of testation affords ample protection.
Many believe that mutual inheritance may be used as a threat to rela-
tives of a person to change the descent of his property. This argument
generalizes occasional abuse of the institution. It further questions the
utility of adoption itself. The usefulness of adoption should sufficiently
answer it, but it may be added that the same objection could be raised
against the right to make a will. Yet no one would suggest the abolition
of the right of free testation merely because the making of a will can
be used occasionally as a threat to relatives to change the descent of
properties. Any such threat violates no right of the relatives, since no-
body, not even forced heirs of a person, has a vested right in the adoptive
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parent's property during his lifetime. During the adoptive parent's life-
time, he may, like the testator, lawfully consume or dispose of his prop-
erty. Adoption may likewise be considered a kind of allowable disposi-
tion.
It is also objected that persons making a will or trust instrument
seldom have in mind the adoption of children at the time the will or trust
instrument is made. The same is true of the subsequent birth of a natural
legitimate child, yet no opposition has been raised against the right of
the natural child to succeed. When a will is made before marriage or
before the birth of a child, generally no provision is made for unborn
children. Most jurisdictions will declare the will void; in fact, some
jurisdictions already apply the rule to adoption,129 and in these jurisdic-
tions no difficulty has so far presented itself.
What has been discussed applies to adoption by unrelated petitioners.
The problems presented by adoption by related petitioners should be con-
sidered on an entirely different basis. Available data indicate that in the
United States related petitioners are involved in about half of all adop-
tions. With thirty-one states making complete reports in 1955, about one
per cent of the adoptive parents were natural parents, thirty-six per cent
were stepparents, and eleven per cent were other relatives. Thus forty-
eight per cent of all adoptions were made by related petitioners. In 1960,
the pattern of distribution was unchanged, with forty-six per cent of
adoptions contracted by related persons.3' These facts speak for the
need of formulating rules for this type of adoption. A different rule is
necessary because the need of the child for responsible tutelage and care
is seldom present in this adoption. This is especially true with the adop-
tion by stepparents, who make up the majority of petitioners. Unless the
other blood parent is dead or unknown, or has consented to the adoption,
the adoption by a stepparent may create new difficulties besides those of
stepparenthood. The wisdom of allowing adoption must be fully con-
sidered, and if allowed by the states, adequate safeguards must be made
to avoid confusion in the definition of the child's family status, allegiance,
and responsibility to all parents. These new insights will then determine
the necessity and structure of the scheme of intestate distribution in this
type of adoption. Particular effort must be made to avoid the anomalous
situation of doubel or multiple filiation and its corollary-multiple in-
heritance.
However, if the adoption by a related petitioner parallels the motive
129 See, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1705 (West 1952).
130 See Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, "Statistical Series No.
39," at 12-13 (1957), for 1955 data, and Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, "Statistical Series No. 66," at 24 (1962) for 1960 data.
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of a conventional adoption, there seems to be no valid reason why the
adoption should be differently regulated.
Although a few jurisdictions regulate the relationship of the descen-
dants of the adopted child with the adoptive parent and his relatives, all
jurisdictions studied disregard the spouse of the adopted child; the spouse
is generally thought of as a stranger. Actually, the spouse of the adopted
child is as much a member of the family of the adopted child as the
child's descendants, and no valid reason can be found to treat the spouse
and the descendants differently. The positions of the spouse and the de-
scendants in the family of the adopted child differ, but the reasons that
can be articulated for assimilating the descendants within the bond of
the adoption apply as well, or perhaps more so, to the spouse of the
adopted child.
VII
MODEL LAW ON THE EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Inheritance is only one of the aspects of a natural legitimate filiation.
Inheritance in adoptive relationship finds its justification, along with the
other effects of adoption, in the purpose of adoption itself. For this rea-
son, its regulation is inseparable from the regulation of the general effects
of adoption such as the right to use the family name, the mutual obliga-
tion of support, and the right to the custody of the person of the adopted
child. These incidents of an adoptive filiation can be described by the
general terms "family rights and duties" because their existence presup-
poses a family relationship. If adoption is faithfully to approximate a
natural legitimate filiation in all its aspects, the only exhaustive and
workable regulation of the effects of adoption is with reference to all the
incidents of a natural legitimate filiation, not by a tedious enumeration
of particular family rights and duties governing the relationship.
The model must be taken only to suggest the basic ideas considered
essential in regulating the effects of adoption. Some reworking in style
when the model is adopted in the civil law or common law is perhaps
necessary: legislative style must sufficiently take into account the custo-
mary legal reasoning of the two systems. The common-law legislation
must use more detailed language to protect the ideas expressed in the
model from the literal-restrictive approach of the courts towards adop-
tion; the civil law may safely use general terms as its courts incline
toward broader interpretation. Further, some adjustment in content may
appear necessary, especially in jurisdictions where the spouse has a dif-
ferent position from that assumed in the model, so as to harmonize the




AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE EFFECTS OF ADOPTIoN OF PERSONs
§ 1. Effect of Adoption to Third Person.
For all legal purposes, the adopted child, his spouse and descendants
shall acquire, as against all persons, the status and family rights and duties
of a natural legitimate child, or spouse and descendants of such natural
legitimate child, of the adoptive parent.
The terms "family rights and duties" as used in this and the following
sections shall be interpreted in their broadest sense with the intent of con-
stituting an adoptive relationship to have all the incidents of a natural
legitimate relationship.
In appropriate cases, sections 1 to 7 shall apply to any act, contract or
transaction by a person or between persons not related to the adopted child
or adoptive parent before or after adoption.
§ 2. Effect of Adoption to Adoptive Parent.
The adopted child, his spouse and descendants shall acquire toward the
adoptive parent the status and all family rights and duties of a natural
legitimate child, or spouse and descendants of such natural legitimate child,
of the adoptive parent. They shall be entitled to inherit from the adoptive
parent with such right, preference and share as the general statutes of
descent and distribution provide for a natural legitimate child, or spouse
and descendants of such natural legitimate child, of the adoptive parent.
The adoptive parent shall have towards the adopted child, his spouse
and descendants the status and all family rights and duties of a natural
legitimate parent of the adopted child. He shall be entitled to inherit from
the adopted child, his spouse and descendants with such right, preference
and share as the general statutes of descent and distribution provide for a
natural legitimate parent of the adopted child.
§ 3. Effect of Adoption to Relatives of Adoptive Parent.
The adopted child, his spouse and descendants shall acquire toward all
relatives of the adoptive parent, of whatever status, line or degree, the
status, and all family rights and duties, and the right of inheritance, of a
natural legitimate child, or spouse and descendants of such natural legiti-
mate child, of the adoptive parent. All relatives of the adoptive parent,
of whatever status, line or degree, shall acquire towards the adopted child,
his spouse and descendants the status, and all family rights and duties,
and the right of inheritance, of relatives of a natural legitimate child, or
spouse and descendants of such natural legitimate child, of the adoptive
parent. The status, line and degree of relationship, and the right, preference
and share in the inheritance which the adopted child, his spouse and de-
scendants shall have toward the relatives of the adoptive parent, or which
these relatives shall have toward the adopted child, his spouse and de-
scendants, shall be that status, line and degree of relationship, and right,
preference and share in the inheritance which the general laws of this state
establish between such relatives and the natural legitimate child, or spouse
and descendants of such natural legitimate child, of the adoptive parent.
§ 4. Effect of Adoption to Relatives of Adopted Child.
All legal and natural relationship of the adopted child toward any per-
son, other than his spouse and descendants and those deriving their rela-
tionship to him through his spouse and descendants, as well as the relation-
ship of his spouse and descendants toward such person derived exclusively
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through the adopted child shall, after adoption, be considered dissolved,
and no family rights and duties, and right of inheritance by and from such
person shall exist.
§ 5. Effect of Adoption by Stepparent.
The adoption of a child by a person married to one of the natural legiti-
mate parents of the adopted child shall establish the same status, family
rights and duties and right of inheritance as provided in sections 2, 3 and
4, provided the other natural legitimate parent is dead or unknown, or has
consented to the adoption and agreed to the consequences of adoption as
provided by this law. In this case, section 4 shall apply only to the other
natural legitimate parent and his relatives.
§ 6. Effect of Adoption by Other Related Persons.
An adoption by any other relative of the adopted child shall be gov-
erned by sections 1 to 4 of this law.
§ 7. Effect of Adoption to Interpretation of Laws, Regulations, Contracts
and Wills.
Any express or implied reference in any law, regulation, contract, agree-
ment, gift, will or any instrument to the child, or the spouse and descendants
of such child, of the adoptive parent shall be construed to include the
adopted child, his spouse and descendants.
Any express or implied reference in any law, regulation, contract, agree-
ment, gift, will or any instrument to the child, or spouse and descendants
of such child, of the natural or former adoptive parent of the adopted
child shall be construed not to include the adopted child, his spouse and
descendants.
Any express or implied reference in any law, regulation, contract, agree-
ment, gift, will or any instrument to the relatives, of whatever status, line
and degree, of the adopted child, or of his spouse and descendants shall be
construed to include only those persons considered in sections 2 to 4 as
relatives of the adopted child, or of his spouse and descendants.
The preceding paragraphs shall not apply if contrary intention clearly
appears from the law, regulation, contract, agreement, will or instrument,
provided however, that the reference to [state the class
of relatives] in section [lapse statute] and section
[pretermission provision] of the Wills Act shall be construed in accordance
with the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
§ 8. Repealing Provision.
The following provisions of [state law or laws] are
hereby repealed: [state section or sections].
The provisions of the model are self-explanatory and need little com-
ment. Section 1 defines the effect of adoption on third persons. Since
adoption is not an isolated relationship between the adopted child and
his family, on one hand, and the adoptive parent and his family, on the
other, this provision is necessary. This provision gives rights and recog-
nizes obligations to third persons toward the adopted child and his family.
It will find application, for instance, in the theory of imputed liability
in tort or warranty in contract. It should also enable the adopted child
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or his family to sue for damages caused to the adoptive parent by third
persons.
The assimilation of the family of the adopted child into the adoptive
parent's family may provoke objections. However, it must be conceded
that any other arrangement confuses the purpose of adoption and re-
duces its usefulness. Where the adopted child has a spouse and de-
scendants at the time of adoption, it is not the child alone who is adopted
into the adoptive family, but the whole family of the adopted child. I
have great sympathy for the position that questions the wisdom of allow-
ing adoption of a child of age, with spouse and descendants. In this case,
the adoption does not have the essential motive of adoption in general,
and it might well be desirable to prohibit adoptions of this kind. It re-
minds us vividly of the anomaly which Cicero condemned when the
Roman patricians and plebians abused adoption to penetrate each other's
ranks to acquire or confer patronal privileges. However, as long as the
states recognize adoption of this nature, this provision must be applied.
Where the adoption is conventional, the subsequent marriage of the
adopted child should be treated as the marriage of a natural legitimate
child. To isolate the adopted child's spouse and descendants from the
family of the adoptive parent will cast a shadow of a stranger's status
upon them.
Section 2 is simple, and prevailing thinking now recognizes the neces-
sity of this provision. If the adoptive parent is married at the time of
adoption, no adoption should be permitted unless both spouses adopt the
child jointly. In this case, section 3 does not apply to the spouse of the
adoptive parent. However, if the adoptive parent marries after adoption,
section 3 should be applied.
Section 3 puts the adopted child and his family within the circle of
the adoptive parent's relations. Thus the adopted child and his family
acquire a new set of relatives. Toward the brothers and sisters of the
adoptive parent, the child is a nephew, whereas to ascendants, he is a
descendant. He and his family must discharge the duties and acquire
the rights which pertain to their new status and relationship. If the adop-
tive parent is an illegitimate child, the adopted child acquires no more
rights and obligations towards the natural relations of the adoptive parent
than he would as a natural legitimate child of an illegitimate child has
toward the relation of the adoptive parent.
Section 4 dissolves all relationship, legal or natural, of the adopted
child and his family before adoption. If his former parent was himself
an adopted child, the adopted child loses the rights and duties derived
in the adoption of his former parent; if the adopted child has been
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previously adopted, the first adoption is dissolved. However, the rela-
tionship of the spouse and descendants which are not derived through
the adopted child remains. For instance, the adopted child's wife re-
mains the natural legitimate daughter of her parents, and her children
are still descendants of her parents. If the wife was an adopted child,
she and her children continue to have the status and rights derived from
her adoption.
Section 5 refers to adoption by a stepparent. It is not desirable to
allow adoption by step-parents unless the purpose is to find a total sub-
stitute for the other parent who must then- be wholly excluded if the
adoption is perfected. In this case, it is necessary to maintain the rela-
tionship of the adopted child to his natural parent (to whom the step-
parent is married) and the parent's relatives.
Section 6 regulates the adoption of children by other relatives in the
same manner as adoption by unrelated petitioners. There is no valid
reason for a different rule in this case, since those relatives who will
adopt the child will be more distant than parent so that the existing
relationship is not an exact equivalent of the adoption. However, in
order to abolish the anomaly of double filiation, it is necessary that the
natural relationship should be dissolved. For instance, if a brother
adopts a nephew, the adoptive parent becomes a natural legitimate parent
and loses the status of uncle. Since the adoption creates a more im-
mediate and primary relationship than the original relationship of uncle
and nephew, the adoption does not prejudice the property rights of the
adopted child, his spouse and descendants.
The adoption by natural parents must be re-examined. These parents
are adopting their illegitimate children, and thus the distinction of adop-
tion and legitimation is confused. Adoption creates a natural legitimate
filiation and logically should be confined to persons who are not by
nature parents of the adopted child. Legitimation must be reserved to
those illegitimate children whose parents want to legalize their existing
natural filiation. Adoption, not legitimation, should be resorted to by
persons who are not parents of illegitimate children.
Section 7 contains important rules of construction. It is similar to, but
broader than, the English law.' In some laws, e.g., the workmen's com-
131 The English adoption law provides:
(2) In any disposition of real or personal property made, whether by instrument inter
vivos or by will (including codicil) after the date of an adoption order-
(a) Any reference (whether express or implied) to the child or children of the
adopter shall, unless the contrary appears, be construed as, or as including, a reference
to the adopted person;
(b) Any reference (whether express or implied) to the child or children of the
adopted person's natural parents or either of them shall, unless the contrary intention
appears, be construed as not being, or as not including, a reference to the adopted
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pensation acts, the adoptive relationship must be fully recognized. This
must also be considered in instruments made between third persons
alone, for instance in a contract with obligations for the benefit of an-
other. The section discards the rule established in Illinois. that the natural
father still has the ultimate liability for the support of the adopted child,
and in Pennsylvania that the adopted child is a lineal descendant of his
natural ancestors for tax purposes. The intent is to remove consistently
all traces of the artificial nature of adoption and to maintain it for all
purposes as a natural legitimate filiation.
person; and
(c) Any reference (whether express or implied) to a person related to the adopted
person in any degree shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as a
reference to the person who would be related to him in that degree if he were the
child of the adopter born in lawful wedlock and were not the child of any other person.
Adoption Act, 1958, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 5, § 16(2).
